In 1968, as Lyndon Johnson prepared to launch his campaign for reelection in the midst of domestic turmoil as great as any since the Depression, two developments dissuaded him
from running.
First, Eugene McCarthy, impelled by opposition to Johnson's Vietnam policy, challenged his own party's president and made a surprisingly strong showing in the New Hampshire primary.
Second, McCarthy's near-victory encouraged Robert Kennedy, with his formidable political and financial resources, to enter the race. Not long after Kennedy entered, Johnson withdrew.
The entry of McCarthy and Kennedy represented an important check of presidential power at a time when such a check was desperately needed; yet, such a challenge would be unlikely if the nation faced such a situation today.
In addition, Kennedy's entry, which did not take place until mid-March, exemplified the ability of a late entry to change the complexion of the race when the front-runner faltered, an option Republicans will wish for in vain this year if Bob Dole proves to be a weak candidate.
The admirable qualities of McCarthy and Kennedy notwithstanding, the difference between 1968 and today does not derive from any diminution in stature of the nation's current political leaders, as a cover
story in a recent Weekly Standard suggests. More likely the cause is to be found in the process of selecting the presidential nominees of the two major parties, and particularly two aspects of this
process the calendar of presidential primaries and the rules of campaign finance. Indeed, the system is depriving the electorate of the optimal choice of presidential candidates and is in urgent need of overhaul.
Most of the calls for campaign reform these days do not address this need. They focus instead on influence peddling in congressional races and the raising of “soft money” in the presidential general election. While such reforms are important, it would be unfortunate if the need to loosen and open up the presidential-nomination process were to be overlooked amid calls for tightening the rules of other contests.
Take the matter of financing presidential nominating campaigns. After entering the race in 1968, Robert Kennedy was able to raise $11 million in eleven weeks, something approaching $30 million in today's dollars. Such a feat would be unimaginable now, even with federal matching funds, because of the current limit of $1,000 on individual contributions. McCarthy, though not nearly as well-connected as Kennedy, was able to come up with $2.5 million (equivalent to about $7 million today) from a mere fifty donors, which must have fortified him in his courageous decision to take on the president.
The second feature badly in need of reform is the calendar of primaries. If Kennedy waited until after the New Hampshire primary to enter the race in 1996, he would be a far longer shot than he was in 1968 because of the way primaries are now frontloaded. In their eagerness to have their say before nominations are locked up, most states have moved their primaries to early in the campaign season. As a result, about seventy percent of the delegates this year, including those of the four largest states, were selected
in primaries and caucuses occurring before the end of March, with the activity compressed into a mere seven weeks.
Nor is 1968 a unique illustration of the weaknesses of the current presidential nominating system. Over the past several elections, complaints have been heard about the caliber of the candidates. Although some of this can be put down to mere
grousing, the fact is that a number of leaders widely viewed as the best candidates have failed to enter the lists.
In 1992, for example, Bentsen, Gore, Nunn, Cuomo, and Bradley all stayed out of the Democratic race, a demonstration of how the current system penalizes those who fail to get off the mark early. In the year before the presidential election, Desert Storm made Bush appear unbeatable, so that those widely viewed as the leading Democratic contenders had reason to believe their best strategy was
to wait until 1996. When it became clear after Buchanan's strong showing in New Hampshire that Bush was vulnerable, it was already too late for the first string to get into the game.
This year we have the cases of Kemp and Powell, among others, on the Republican side. Kemp cited the difficulties of raising money as a major decision for sitting the race out. Powell's withdrawal also probably had to do, at least in part, with the exigencies of the present system. Had he entered in
November, the month he withdrew, he would have faced a formidable task in catching up financially to Dole, Gramm, Buchanan, and Forbes. Because of the way primaries are now compressed early in the year, even an impressive victory in New Hampshire would probably not have enabled him to raise funds in time for other major contests.
Even though these many examples suggest fundamental weaknesses in the current nominating process, is it possible that it has strengths that more than compensate for them?
Although the calendar has little to recommend it, the present rules on campaign finance, enacted by Congress in the aftermath of Watergate, have one considerable virtue: in limiting individual contributions to candidates to $1,000 and PAC contributions to $5,000 (PAC's are not a significant factor in
pre-nomination races), the system has all but eliminated the potential that fat cats and special interests can buy the nomination.
Fortunately, campaign finance can be restructured so as to retain this advantage while gaining the openness and flexibility that the system
now lacks.
Congress is the only body with the authority to institute a set of fully coordinated political and financial rules that could bring order, fairness, and better results to the process. What, first, are its options on calendar reform?
The simplest option would be to have all primaries and
caucuses on a single day. This has been proposed often, since it would achieve in one fell swoop what the states have been trying to do
piecemeal namely, insure that no state gets left out of the decision-making process because its primary comes too late.
But a single-day event would result in a campaign almost totally dominated by big media, with the need for early big money even greater than it is today. There would also be little of the person-to-person contact that occurs in places like Iowa and New Hampshire, where candidates are screened by real people. The set of candidates with a realistic chance in such a system would be limited to celebrities, a few well-known national leaders, well-known retreads, and the super-rich.
Another option would be to create a series of four to six regional events by mandating that states within a given region hold their primaries (or start their caucus processes) on the same day. If these events were scheduled with two or three weeks between them, it would
ease cash-flow problems somewhat and give lesser-known candidates a fighting chance to parlay early victories into money
for later primaries. But there would still be little opportunity for candidates to be screened in person by actual voters.
Perhaps, then, the best system would be a modified regional primary system that
still preserves at least one individual state primary in each region, in most cases occurring a week in advance of the regional event.
The accompanying chart suggests what such a process might be. Iowa, New Hampshire, Florida, Texas, Wisconsin, and California are chosen for singlestate contests because of their historic significance in presidential nomination politics. Colorado is the Mountain States' lead primary for geographic and media reasons, and New Jersey is chosen for the Middle Atlantic region principally because all television advertising there is based in New York and Pennsylvania and thus gives the campaigns a leg up in those states. Given the size of California, it makes media and political sense for it to be an exception and follow the other Pacific states.
The proposed fifteen-week season, together with reforms in fundraising rules, would give relatively unknown candidates of no great wealth the chance to achieve visibility, build constituencies, create momentum, and go on to victory. It would also permit later entry into the race than is possible today and encourage candidates to remain in the race longer, since the variety of single-state and regional contests would provide chances for candidates who stumble early to recover and come back.
What changes in campaign finance rules would be needed to make the system work? The following, I believe, would go a long way toward that end:
Raise the maximum allowable size of a contribution from the $1,000 it is today to $10,000 per individual and $20,000 per family. Since the current limit has never been adjusted for inflation since it was set in 1974, an increase from $1,000 to $2,500 would return things
to their original state in terms of purchasing power. But raising the limit to $10,000 would greatly enhance fundraising while not compromising the integrity of the system, since megacontributions sufficient to “buy” a candidate would still be outlawed. At a minimum, a candidate would still need more than 4,000 contributors to fund a campaign, which would keep any one person, family, or small group of individuals from having disproportionate influence.
Keep the current rules for qualifying for federal matching funds but increase the amount of the match. Currently the government matches all contributions for qualified candidates (those who abide by a variety of spending limits) up to $250 and $2,000. The combined effect of these two changes would be to enhance the value of the match, which has been much diminished in importance by inflation.
Double the spending limit per candidate to $60 million and index it. The national spending limits in force today are such that, unless a contest ends early, there is a
good chance candidates will max out and have to choose between breaking the law and curtailing their efforts. Bush faced precisely this choice in 1988, but prevailed anyway because Dole lacked the means to carry on the fight after failing to win a state in Super Tuesday.
The current system, in other words, is geared to a quick knockout, even though such an outcome does not always serve the public interest. Raising national spending limits would also address the Forbes factor (the exemption from spending limits of candidates rich enough to forego matching funds), for it would then take $70 to $100 million of their own money to out spend the competition instead of the $35 million it takes now.
Another way to address the Forbes factor is to increase the limits in Iowa and New Hampshire to $2 million, about triple what it now is in New Hampshire and about double what it is in Iowa. Spending limits per state are determined by population, a formula that does not do justice
to the political importance of these two. Raising the limits there will keep candidates lacking great wealth from being vastly outspent by the super-rich.
Create a Media Bank for candidates who accept matching funds and who achieve a specified minimum level of voter support.
The requirement might be winning at least one primary or getting twenty percent of the vote in two primaries or fifteen percent in three. Candidates meeting the standard would be guaranteed access to $5 million worth of national media time and $10 million worth of local media time for the balance of the campaign, with these amounts to count toward spending totals. The burden of this expenditure could be apportioned among broadcasters, including cable.
The sum total of these financial and calendar changes would be nomination contests with an openness and a flexibility that are now lacking.
This system was instituted at a time of profound distrust of the presidency, when restoring confidence in the presidential selection process was a matter
of national urgency. Although that goal has been achieved, two decades later it is clear that the system is forcing too many of our best political leaders to the sidelines. That is no small deficiency in a system to choose the occupant of the world's most important office. The sooner we remedy it the better.
